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The European Community and the 
Third World 
Frank Ellis 
The European Community has been growing in importance for developing countries 
both as a market for their products and raw materials, and as a supplier of  the manu-
factured goods they require for their development. As a consequence of  enlargement, the 
Community  and its members have  also  become the  largest  single  source of aid and 
financial assistance for the Third World. 
Individual European countries have traditional links with a number of  developing 
countries deriving from the colonial past. These have resulted in  a special Association 
agreement being formed between the Community and a selected group of  countries - an 
arrangement  which  excludes large  areas of the developing  world,  though  it does  not 
exclude them from national aid.  The Community also has general trade policies which 
affect all Third World countries. The most important of  these are the Common External 
Tariff ( CET}, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP,) and the Generalised Scheme of 
Preference ( GSP). 
The accession of  Britain to the Community on January 1, 1973 has important implica-
tions for poor countries' future relations with Europe.  In  the period up to 1978 Britain 
must  abandon  traditional  trade  preferences  in  favour  of Commonwealth  developing 
countries as part of the process of moving  towards  adoption of general  Community 
policies. 
The  EEC contains  7 per cent of the  world's population  and enjoys an  average 
income per person of  £1,500 per year. By contrast the Third World contains two thirds of 
the world's population, and its people have an annual income of  only £100 on average. The 
gap  is widening due  not only to  internal difficulties and the faster rate of  population 
growth  experienced in  the  Third  World,  but also  to  severe  disadvantages faced by 
developing countries in their international relations with Western countries. 
For the future, the Community will have to look to establishing relationships which 
transmit benefits widely between and within all developing countries. These relationships 
can  be established without diminishing- indeed they should enhance- Europe's own 
prestige and prosperity in the world. 
Background 
The nine member countries of the European Com-
munity are collectively in a position to exert a powerful 
influence  on the prospects  facing  poor countries in 
their hopes for development in the next decade. This 
influence derives both from historical and traditional 
links between individual European countries and the 
Third World, and from the dominant position which 
the enlarged Community holds today in world trade 
and  aid  arrangements.  The  way  in  which  Europe 
discharges the responsibilities of  this position will be a 
key factor in determining whether or not the widening 
gap between the rich and poor of the world can be 
halted or reversed. 
Historically,  Britain,  France and to a  lesser  (but 
nevertheless important) extent, Holland, Belgium and 
Germany,  were  responsible in the latter half of the 
last  century  and  early  decades  of this  century  for 
bringing a majority of  Third World countries into the 
international  arena.  Under  colonial  regimes  poor 
countries  provided  a  large  proportion  of the  raw 
materials  required  for  rapid  industrial  growth  in 
Europe. They also provided new and growing markets 
for European exports of  finished manufactured goods, 
and a  ready outlet for profitable lines of investment 
from  European  capitals.  The  flows  of trade  and 
financial  resources  established  during  that  period 
continue  to  regulate  to  an  important  degree  the 
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relationships  which  now-independent  developing 
countries have with the industrial world. 
In the 1970s new situations have arisen which have 
tended to increase rather then diminish the importance 
of European attitudes and policies for Third World 
Development. The foremost of  these was the accession 
to  the  EEC  of Britain  (along  with  Denmark  and 
Ireland) on January 1,  1973. 
Apart from the direct effect of enlargement on the 
Community's size as a  trading entity, this event was 
particularly significant for the thirty or so developing 
countries  of the  Commonwealth including  amongst 
them the largest and poorest countries of the Third 
World (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). Britain had 
hitherto  followed  its  own  trade,  aid  and  technical 
assistance  policies  with  Commonwealth  developing 
countries. 
In the case of trade these policies were traditionally 
favourable to the under-developed countries compared 
to the trading policies  of other industrial countries 
(zero import duties for the majority of products of 
Commonwealth  origin,  and  special  market  sharing 
arrangements  for  particular  commodities  such  as 
sugar).  These  national  preferences  must  now  be 
abandoned as Britain moves its overseas policies into 
line  with  those  of the  EEC.  A  second  important 
phenomenon leading to increased European responsi-
bility in the development field has been the decline of 
United  States  interest  in  pursuing  international policies  directed  towards developing countries.  This 
has been a consequence not only of the Vietnam war, 
but also of  the serious balance of  payments and mone-
tary  problems  which  have  beset  the  United  States-
since 1970.1 
Hence, both as  a consequence of enlargement and 
through  more  general  developments,  the  European 
Community  now  provides  by  far  the  largest  single 
market for products exported by developing countries, 
taking £8,700 million, or 34 per cent, of their exports 
in 1971. It also predominates in aid flows  (providing 
£1,430 million, or nearly 50 per cent, of the total aid 
flows  of £3,605 million from developed to developing 
countries in 1972), and is the largest supplier of Third 
World imports (£7,530 million or 38 per cent in 1972). 
The performance of individual European countries in 
respect of these flows varies markedly as an examina-
tion of trends in the last decade shows (Table I). 
Trade and aid 
The argument used by economists for the freeing of 
trade between countries is that if a country specialises 
in the production of commodities which it is good at 
producing in comparison to other countries,  then it 
will  become better off by  trading than if it did not 
specialise.  This  argument  may  be  illustrated  by  a 
simple example. Compared with India, Europe is good 
at producing complex industrial machinery because the 
capital  and  skill  needed  for  investment  in  heavy 
industry  in  Europe  is  cheaper  and  more  readily 
available than in India. India on the other hand is good 
at producing cotton textiles,  because the labour and 
simple machinery needed for cotton textile production 
are much cheaper and more available in India than in 
Europe. It is therefore senseless for Europe to produce 
its  own  expensive  cotton textiles  using  scarce  man-
Table 1 
Performance of  individual European countires (plus details of  world aid) 1967 and 1972. 
AID  GNP** 
AID  Average  as a  %of  per 
Country  £million  annual%  Gross National  capita 
increase  Income*  1972 
1967  1972  1967-1972  1967  1972  £ 
Belgium  37·0  80·5  23%  0·45  0·55  1,500 
Denmark  10·8  39·8  54%  0·21  0·45  1,754 
France  344·0  550·2  12%  0·71  0·67  1,579 
Germany  212·0  336·8  12%  0·41  0·31  1,738 
Italy  64·5  41·0  -7%  0·22  0·08  878 
Netherlands  47·3  127·8  34%  0·49  0·67  1,429 
UK  202·1  253·6  5%  0·44  0·40  1,133 
EECTotal  917·6  1,429·8  11%  - - -
USA  1,446·6  1,395·4  -0·7%  0·43  0·29  2,296 
JAPAN  157·9  254·6  12%  0·31  0·21  1,146 
OTHERS  201·1  525·8  32%  - - -
Total Aid  2,723·2  3,605·6  6·5%  0·42  0·34  1,568 
* The aid target for the second United Nation's Development Decade (1970s)  was 
that each developed country should give 0·7% of its national product to aid. Note 
how overall performance has fallen to half  that figure in 1972; though some European 
countries have been improving (Belgium, Denmark and Holland). 
**  Average GNP per person in the Third World is £100. 
These figures should be set against a background in 
which  the  overall  share  of developing  countries  in 
world trade has fallen from 21  per cent to 17 per cent 
in ten years, and the gap between average per capita 
incomes in Europe and those in developing countries 
has been widening. The mere size of Europe's position 
in the international context of  development should be 
no cause for self-congratulation. 
The trade and aid relationship between developed 
and developing countries is  of crucial importance to 
the  development  prospects  of  the  latter.  Before 
examining European policies towards the Third World 
in detail it is instructive to analyse in general terms the 
contributions  which  trade  and  aid  can  make  in 
alleviating  the  problems  of economic  development 
today. 
I  See: ESTS Nos. 16, 17 'Bretton Woods and Mer'. 
power, when it can buy them more cheaply from India. 
It is  also senseless for India to spend its very scarce 
capital resources and few skilled people for producing 
industrial machinery when it has major problems of 
unemployment  and  poverty.  Both  countries  wi1l 
obviously be better off if  they specialise in the produc-
tion which they are best at, and exchange their goods 
through trade. Correspondingly both sides are losing 
if they do not trade. The argument for trade is there-
fore  one of mutual gain: it is  not a one-sided affair. 
There is a big difference, however, in the degree to 
which trade can be important to a developing country 
compared with a developed country. This is because a 
rich  and  highly  complex  economy  can  sometimes 
afford to be wasteful in the choice of what it produces 
because  no  single  commodity  forms  a  very  high 
proportion of its total production. A poor country on 
the other hand cannot afford  to be  at all  wasteful, (though  sometimes  they  are,  for  example,  in  the 
purchase of expensive weaponry). Its exports are very 
often  the  most  important  method  by  which  it can 
generate revenues for development. Many would argue 
that  only  in  trade  lay  the  solution  to  the  massive 
problems of overpopulation and poverty in a country 
like  India.  Therefore the  argument is  not only  that 
both countries will gain from trade, but that for the 
poor country the gain will be compounded by provid-
ing  an  essential  contribution  to  its  development 
process. 
Aid 
Aid also has a part to play in helping to alleviate the 
problems of the Third World. There are a number of 
different forms of  aid ranging from grants to carry out 
specific  projects  (like  building  hospitals,  schools, 
roads, or irrigation schemes) to loans on concessional 
terms (i.e.  at lower rates of interest than money can 
normally  be  borrowed)  and technical assistance  (the 
provision of skilled manpower to help with carrying 
out projects  and  to  help  countries  formulate  their 
development policies). The majority of  aid is channelled 
in  the  form  of bilateral flows  between  individual 
developed countries and individual developing coun-
tries.  Developed countries also provide funds for the 
international  agencies  (like  the  United  Nations 
Development  Programme,  UNDP;  or  the  United 
Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development, 
UNCTAD) and these  funds  are  then distributed  as 
multilateral aid by the agencies themselves. 
The United Nations has set a target for the amount 
of aid that developed countries should provide for the 
Third World in the  1970s:  each  developed  country 
should  spend  0·7  per  cent  of its  Gross  National 
Income in assisting developing countries. An inspec-
tion of Table 1, on page 2,  shows how total aid from 
developed countries has fallen from 0·42 per cent of 
their  combined  national  incomes  to  0· 35  per  cent 
between 1969 and 1972 - half the UN target. European 
countries have in general been much more responsible 
than the USA or Japan towards this target; Belgium, 
France and the  Netherlands have nearly reached it; 
and the UK and Denmark are also more than halfway 
there. 
It is generally much more difficult to argue the case 
for more aid compared to arguing the case for more 
trade (where the point is one of mutual gain between 
both trading partners). This is because aid is essentially 
an appeal to the moral responsibility or generosity of 
rich countries rather than an appeal to their common 
sense  or  self-interest,  which  trade  at  least  partly 
satisfies.  In addition many developing countries are 
beginning to feel uncomfortable about the aid relation-
ship  between  themselves  and rich  countries because 
such a relationship can easily be a patronising one in 
which they are clearly seen to be receiving charity. For 
these reasons improvement of  trade access would seem 
to  many  to  be  a  better  long  term  proposition  for 
improving the situation of poor countries than aid. 
One further major flow  of resources to the Third 
World  takes  place  in  the  form  of private  direct 
investment from developed countries. This is the term 
used to describe the operations of private firms when 
they  set  up factories  and production in  developing 
countries.  As  the  majority  of these  flows  are  not 
government  sponsored  and  little  affected  by  EEC 
common policies  (many  of the firms  concerned  are 
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multi-national corporations based in several developed 
countries), the implications of  such flows are not dealt 
with in detail here. 
Trade barriers 
One of  the most important features of  the formation 
of  a common market such as the European Community 
is  that all  trade  barriers between  member countries 
inside the market are removed. This feature explicitly 
recognises  the  argument  for  gains  from  free  trade 
outlined above, and the consequence is an expansion 
of trade  within  the  market  area,  sometimes  at the 
expense  of supplies  from  traditional sources  outside 
the  area.  The  common  market  as  a  whole  thus 
.  becomes  more  self-sufficient  in  some  commodities 
than individual countries were before its creation. 
In the case of  the EEC, barriers to trade have already 
been removed for the original six countries and are in 
the process of being removed before 1978 for the three 
new  members.  Individual  countries  previously  had 
barriers  consisting  of customs  duties,  quotas  and 
import taxes of various kinds which  restricted intra-
European  trade,  as  well  as  protecting  them  from 
imports  from  the  rest  of the  world.  The  EEC  has 
replaced  its  Member  States  external  tariffs  with  a 
common level  of custom duties called  the  Common 
External Tariff (CET). The CET is modified, however, 
for  certain  groups  of outside  countries  by  special 
arrangements.  The  most  favourable  of these  is  an 
agreement made with countries of the European Free 
Trade Area (EFT  A), of  which Britain used to be part, 
to remove all trade barriers on industrial products by 
1978. The second most favourable are various policies 
of Association between the EEC and certain Mediter-
ranean countries; and with ex-colonies of France and 
Belgium who joined in a special agreement called the 
Yaounde  Convention  of Association.2  Under terms 
set out in the UK Treaty of Accession certain Com-
monwealth countries known at present as the 'Asso-
ciables' have been offered similar trade terms to the 
present Associates.  Notable exceptions  to this  offer 
on  the  grounds  that  their  'economic  structure'  is 
different  from  existing  Associates  are  the  Asian 
Commonwealth countries oflndia, Sri Lanka(Ceylon), 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong 
Kong. The EEC offers more limited preferential trade 
terms  to  other  developing  countries  (including  the 
latter seven countries) under its Generalised Preference 
Scheme (GSP). 
Table 2 overleaf, sets out these different schemes in 
the order of  how favourable are the terms of access to 
European markets for outside suppliers. 
The table also illustrates a further policy of  the EEC 
which  has  important  consequences  for  the  trade 
prospects of the Third World.  This is  the  Common 
Agricultural PoJicy (CAP), which is discussed in more 
detail further on. Agricultural products coming under 
the CAP are excluded from all the above preferential 
arrangements. 
The policy of Association 
The principles governing the EEC's relations with 
former colonies of  Member States were set down in the 
Treaty  of Rome  which  founded  the  Community in 
1957.  Amongst these principles were clauses allowing 
2  Yaounde is the capital city of Cameroon in West Africa. Table 2 
The Hierarchy of  EEC Trading Relations 
Group of  Countries 
1.  EFTA partners. 
Existing Yaounde Associates (18). 
2. 
New Commonwealth Associables (20-23). 
3.  Mediterranean Associates (12). 
4.  Other developing countries. 
5.  Other developed countries. 
colonies of individual member countries of the Six to 
be associated with the EEC under special terms. It is 
important to stress that subsequent to the Treaty of 
Rome the Community has not yet been able to agree on 
an official and comprehensive Common Development 
Policy. Instead it has proceeded with a series of  ad hoc 
arrangements adopted to meet changing circumstances. 
The blueprint for relations with developing coun-
tries  is  provided  by  the  Yaounde  Convention  of 
Association  first  signed  in  1963  and  subsequently 
renewed  in  1969.  This  Convention  established  the 
terms  under  which  eighteen  African  states  and 
Madagascar (former colonies of France and Belgium 
which  had  become  independent  between  1958  and 
1963)3  would  associate with  the  Community. It has 
since become the cornerstone and main expression of 
EEC common  policy  towards  developing  countries, 
although all Community countries maintain their own 
national  development policies  as  well.  It allows  for 
free  trade in all  manufactured goods between Asso-
ciates  and  the .  EEC,  but grants  only  very  limited 
preferential  access  for  processed  foods  and agricul-
tural products covered by the CAP i.e. a few small cuts 
in the import duties on some of  those products. This is 
a pity because developing countries are often best at 
producing simple processed foods and farm products. 
In the enlargement negotiations between Britain and 
the Community it was agreed that only those develop-
ing countries  of the Commonwealth with  a  similar 
economic and geographical structure to the existing 
Associates would be permitted to join the Association. 
The  countries  concerned  (twenty  Commonwealth 
countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and Pacific)4 were 
offered three options for links with the Community: 
(a)  a full  Association along the lines  of the existing 
Yaounde Convention; (b) a more limited Association 
excluding the aid and loan provisions, and with more 
restricted trade terms; (c) a trade agreement on specific 
commodities. The final terms must be agreed between 
these  countries,  existing  Associates,  and  the  Com-
munity, in time for a new Association to come into 
operation on January 31,  1975. 
There  can  be  no  doubt that Association  as  thus 
3  Burundi,  Cameroon,  Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  Congo,  Dahomey, 
Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mali, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Somalia, Upper Volta, Togo, Zaire. 
Free trade in manufactures by  1978. 
Duty  free entry for all goods except those governed by 
the  Common  Agricultural  Policy,  in  return  for 
limited 'reverse preferences'. 
Offer of same terms as existing Associates; probably 
abolition of reverse  preference  requirement in  new 
Association Convention (to be signed Jan. 31, 1975). 
Varying terms.  Turkey  and Greece  membership  of 
EEC envisaged after a certain period of time. Others 
generally duty-free entry with some minor concessions 
on agricultural products. 
Limited duty-free for manufactures under the Genera-
lised Preference Scheme. 
Normal Common External Tariff (CET). 
conceived  is  a  policy  which  discriminates  among 
Third World countries, and into the bargain is not as 
generous as it might first appear. 
In the first place, the forty or so developing coun-
tries which are either Associated or have been offered 
the option of Association only comprise 350 million 
people (19 per cent) of  a total Third World population 
of I,  793 million people. In particular the Association 
excludes the whole of Asia (1,070 million) and South 
America (287 million). Nor are the countries concerned 
in general the poorest of the world, or those with the 
biggest  problems  of poverty and malnutrition (such 
as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). The reasons given 
for exclusion  of these  countries include  the lack  of 
geographical  and  historical  similarity  with  existing 
Associates and the sheer scale of  the additional burden. 
However,  the  success  which  many  Asian  countries 
have shown in the efficient production for export of 
simple  manufactured  goods  such  as  cotton textiles, 
clothing,  shoes  and  children's  toys,  which  compete 
most effectively with industries manufacturing similar 
articles in Europe, may also have something to do with 
their exclusion. 
There is  even evidence  to suggest  that Associates 
may  not  be  gaining  very  much  from  their  special 
relationship with the EEC. One study has shown that 
while exports from Associates to the EEC expanded by 
7·2 per cent per annum between 1959 and 1969, EEC 
imports  from  other  developing  countries  actually 
expanded at the higher rate of 7·9 per cent.S 
A final issue of  Association has been the question of 
whether the EEC should demand return preferential 
treatment from the developing countries in the agree-
ment. In the 1963 and 1969 Conventions, free entry for 
Associates to EEC markets was made conditional upon 
their offering 'reverse preferences' to EEC exports in 
return. A number of escape clauses permitted Asso-
ciates to avoid this necessity,  and pressure from the 
negotiatiors  of the  new  Association  will  probably 
result  in  this  clause  being  dropped  from  the  next 
Convention. 
4  Africa:  Botswana,  Gambia,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Malawi,  Mauritius, 
Nigeria,  Sierra  Leone,  Swaziland,  Tanzania,  Uganda,  Zambia.  Caribbean: 
Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad, Tobago, Pacific: FiJi, Tonga, Western 
Samoa. 
s Young,  C.:  Association  with  the  EEC:  Economic  Aspects  of the  Trade 
Relationship. Journal of  Common Market Studies, December, 1972. 
Continued in ESTS 20 
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THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY  AND AID TO
THE THIRD WORLD
OTHERS**
f201.1m
The EEC in World Aid to Developing Countries
Totaf aid'1967
f2,7 23.2 millions ( 1 00%)
1967 and'1972
Total aid'1972
f3,605.6 mil lions (lOO%l
Average  annual % increase 1967-1972
EEC*  USA  IAPAN OTHERS** TOTAL AID * Including U.K. and Denmark  for
both dates
** Other European countries,
Canada and Australia.
1196 O.70/6 12% 3296 6.s%
Breakdown of financial  resources from the EEC to the Third World '1972
Total financial flows (l$U/ol
f2,958.1 millions
OTHER
FLOWS
*  Aid is defined  as
(a) Bilateral  free government
grants.
(b) Bilateral  government  loans on
easy terms.
(c) Multinational  aid through
international agencies  (e.g. U nited
Nations Development  Program me).
**  Mainly by private  companies and
multi-national  corporations.
f146.3m
5o/o
TOTAL
AID*
f.l,429.8m
48%
to
international
agencies.
PRIVATE
AGENCY AID
f92.5m
OTHERS**
f 525.8m
14%
(a) Grants
f,831.3m
280.h
PRIVATE
DIRECT
INVESTMENT**
f 1,289.5m
44%
(b) Loans
8264.8m
(c) Resources
8333.7m
11%
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The Common Agricultural Policy 
Michael Berendt 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been described as the engine of  the 
Common  Market, and despite  the problems which  have arisen  during  its introduction 
and implementation, it has been a forceful instrument of  European integration. 
But the CAP has more than purely political value.  In a world of uncertain food 
supplies it is providing the Community consumer with security of  supply at stable prices. 
By guarding against violent fluctuations in farmgate prices, the policy gives to relatively 
efficient farmers throughout the EEC the confidence to provide the food needed and a 
market of  253 million consumers in which to sell it. 
Like all agricultural policies, the CAP has to reconcile certain conflicts of interest. 
When  support measures are needed,  they have to  be paid for,  imposing costs on  tax-
payers or consumers,· the Community's relations with the rest of  the world have to be 
taken into account in  developing the policy; and the short-term interests of  consumers 
and producers do  not always coincide.  But since its introduction in  the late 1960s the 
policy has been  continuously modified and adapted to  meet changing situations.  This 
process continues. 
The historical background 
In comparing the social and economic structure of 
Britain  with  that  of other  European  countries,  no 
sector presents such a vivid contrast as agriculture. To 
take  two  illustrations:  the  British  farmer  is  widely 
regarded - and certainly regards himself-as a member 
of the entrepreneurial middle classes,  a  professional 
man.  Throughout much  of Continental  Europe  the 
farmer sees himself more as an artisan seeking a wage-
earner's income. 
The difference also  shows itself in the attitudes to 
food supply. Continental agriculture has traditionally 
embraced the aim of self-sufficiency,  even at a  rela-
tively  high  price,  trying  to  meet  all  domestic  food 
demand  with  homegrown  supplies.  British  farming 
policy, until the adoption of  the Common Agricultural 
policy,  was  linked to cheap world supplies  of food-
stuffs and never sought dramatic expansion in domestic 
output, except in time of war. 
The  divergence  between  British  agriculture  and 
agriculture in the rest of Europe has its origins in the 
enclosures, the industrial revolution and before, when 
the movement of people away from the countryside 
and into the towns gathered momentum in Britain, 
accompanied by rapid development in the technology 
of more efficient  farming.  These  trends  were  by  no 
means as marked on the Continent. 
The most dramatic changes took place in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, when the British free 
trade policy enshrined in the repeal of the Corn Laws 
in 1846 really began to bite. These laws implied that 
Britain would buy food in the world from the cheapest 
source  and would  in  return  secure  widespread  and 
open markets for her manufacturing exports; domestic 
agriculture must sink or swim as best it could. 
With the coming of  the railroads and the opening up 
of the North American prairies, many parts of British 
agriculture  in  fact  began  to  sink.  Wheat  prices  in 
Britain fell  from £13·34 a ton in 1867-9 to £6·08  in 
1894-1903 and wheat production accordingly dropped 
from 2·9 million tons to 1·5 million tons over the same 
period. The area of  arable land decreased and although 
livestock production was not so severely hit (because 
feedingstuffs  became  cheaper)  overall  output  from 
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British  farms  increased  by  only  a  quarter per cent 
annually  for  the  40  years  after  1870.  Moreover, 
although  the  number  of people  working  in  British 
agriculture fell from 20 per cent of  the working popula-
tion  in  1870  to  11  per cent  in  1910,  the  farmers' 
average income continued to decline. 
The industrial revolution had less social impact on 
the rest of Europe, and when cheap American - and 
Russian- grain became available to Western Europe, 
workers on the land still accounted for nearly half the 
total labour force  in the economies  of France  and 
Germany.  The  sheer  numbers  of people  involved, 
coupled with a respect for the peasant farmer as the 
basis of a stable society, led these countries to recon-
sider  their  policies  of  free  trade  in  agricultural 
products. Accordingly, during the last 30 years of the 
nineteenth  century,  most European  countries  intro-
duced measures to protect their farming from cheap 
imports.l  Tariffs  increased,  and  domestic  grain 
production was maintained. Thus even by the end of 
the  century  the  farming  population  of France  and 
Germany accounted for 40  per cent of the national 
work force. 
When the task of European reconstruction began 
after the Second World War,  this was the legacy:  a 
high  proportion of the  population in agriculture;  a 
tradition  of protectionism  in  every  country  except 
Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 
which was  designed to isolate the individual farming 
economies of European states; and a peasant agricul-
ture based on small-scale and scattered units ill-suited 
to  exploiting  modern  technical  developments  in 
agriculture. 
Creating a common 
agricultural policy 
As the idea of  European integration gained strength 
first  with the European Coal and Steel  Community 
and its central policy-making structure and then with 
the EEC, agriculture had inevitably to play a crucial 
t  The Great Depression of  the 1930s made the situation worse. So abundant were 
cheap grain  supplies that even Britain was obliged to take protective measures and 
the tariff barriers In most European countries were Pushed uo. sometimes to 
three times the world orice. role. By 1958 there were still 17-! million people in the 
Six  who earned their living from  the land and they 
represented an important element in the population. 
A  customs  union  could  not be introduced  without 
taking account of  agriculture and foodstuffs.  Further-
more, it was important to provide a sound framework 
for  the  agricultura]  revolution  which  was  already 
taking place in all European countries, with more and 
more people  leaving  farming  for  rapidly  expanding 
industries. There had also to be taken into account the 
balance of interest between France, the great agricul-
tural producer and industrial importer, and Germany, 
heavily  industrialised  but an importer· of foodstuffs. 
The Treaty of Rome, which laid .down the frame-
work for the European Economic Community, there-
fore  included  an  important  section  on  agriculture 
providing  for  a  common  market  in  agricultural 
products. 
"Article 39 
1.  The objectives of  the common agricultural policy 
shall be: 
(a)  to  increase  agricultural  productivity  by 
promoting technical progress and by ensuring 
the  rational  development  of  agricultural 
production and the optimum utilisation of  the 
factors  of production, in particular labour; 
(b)  thus to ensure a fair standard of  living for the 
agricultural  community,  in  particular  by 
increasing the individual earnings of persons 
engaged in agriculture; 
(c)  to stabilise markets; 
(d)  to assure the availability of supplies; 
(e)  to ensure  that supplies  reach consumers  at 
reasonable prices. 
2.  In working out the common agricultural policy 
and the special methods for its application, account 
shall be taken of: 
(a)  the particular nature of agricultural activity, 
which  results  from  the  social  structure  of 
agriculture and from structural and natural 
disparities  between  the  various  agricultural 
regions; 
(b)  the  need  to  effect  the  appropriate  adjust-
ments by degrees; 
(c)  the fact that in the ~iember  States agriculture 
constitutes  a  sector closely  linked  with  the 
economy as a whole." 
A framework for change 
Over the period between 1850 and 1950 the agricul-
tural population in the Six would-be members of the 
EEC fell from 50 to 30 per cent of the total working 
population. Between 1950 and 1973 it fell from 30 per 
cent to 10 per cent. Consistently over the last 20 years, 
half a million people annually have left the land, either 
retiring or finding jobs outside agriculture (Table  1). 
The amenities, variety and above all the regular wages 
of urban life have far outweighed the mixed blessings 
of peasant farming as subsistence income. The steady 
industrial expansion and rising prosperity of  continen-
tal Europe have provided new jobs and hence oppor-
tunities  for  escape,  even  though  such  escape  may 
involve travelling to the other end of one country or 
beyond-as it does for many Italians. It  is the, younger 
people particularly who' have gone. away,  leaving an 
2 
agricultural population which is on average older than 
the population at large.2 
Ever since the war this movement of people out of 
agriculture has been affecting rural areas, involving the 
decline  of country  towns  and  villages,  often  the 
disappearance of village schools and shops and even 
the  dereliction  of land.  A journey through parts of 
Normandy and Brittany, or into the Massif Central or 
the Italian Mezzogiorno provides ample evidence of 
the decline of traditional peasant agriculture. Details 
of the causes of rural depopulation are scarce; how-
ever, Table 2,  below, gives the results of one detailed 
case study done in the UK. 
Table 2 
Reasons for  Movement from  North  Norfolk  Farms, 
1960-70* 
Number  Per cent 
of total 
Dissatisfied with work or 
conditions  86  18·0 
Worker's wife or family 
dissatisfied  10  2·1 
Attracted by other employment  24  5·0 
Wages  111  23·3 
Dismissed  35  7·3 
Ill-health  18  3·8 
Housing problems  18  3·8 
Redundancy  154  32·3 
Other reasons  21  4·4 
Total  477  100·0 
* Active workers only:  workers who  died  or retired 
are not included. 
Source: Rogers, S. J. and Davey, B. H., The Common 
Agricultural  Policy  and  Britain,  ed.  Saxon  House. 
1973. p.133. 
An important function of the common agricultural 
policy  is  to  provide  a  framework  for  this  social 
revolution  in  the  agricultural  areas.  The  common 
prices  guaranteed  under  the  policy,  relatively  high 
though they are, will never provide a reasonable living 
for the farmer with an uneconomic herd of  four or five 
cows and  10 acres of land, but do generally give an 
adequate  income  for  the  full-time  producer who  is 
able  to  make  his  enterprise  fairly  efficient.  For a 
minority  of farmers  with  large  holdings  there  are 
substantial profits because the poHcy provides all the 
advantages of  a vast market of  253 million people, but 
for all farmers it gives stability, protecting them from 
violent fluctuations in prices. 
The  difficulties  facing  the  common  policy  are 
compounded by the extremely wide  gap between the 
efficient  and the inefficient  producers and there is  a 
tendency  to allow time  to  solve  the problem as  the 
inefficient are squeezed out of business.  The peasant 
farmer,  operating  on  too  smaU  a  scale  to  give  a 
reasonable  standard  of living,  still  poses  a  serious 
problem for the Community) 
Social  considerations  in  rural  areas  and  also  the 
effect  on the general level  of support prices  fixed  in 
2  In 1968, half the people running farms were aged 57 or older. 
3  Th~  average EEC fa~er  has about 7 cows and. 25 acres compared with British 
averages of 40 cows and 75 acres.  I agriculture are involved.  Most national governments 
~ave spent c<;msidera~le sums of money in the past to 
Improve  theu  farmmg  structure.  The  Six  original 
m~D?-ber  c~mntries  of  th~  Community  spent  2,500 
million umts of account (Just over £1,000 million) on 
modernising their farms in 1972, while another 2 400 
million  ua.  were  set  aside  for  social  expenditure 
related to agriculture - pensions, sickness benefits and 
so on. Actual support of  farm prices came to a further 
2,300 million ua. during that year.4 
Recently, the common agricultural policy has been 
extended  to provide  help  for  the  modernisation  of 
farm  structure  and to  ease  the  social  problems  of 
rural  areas.  Measures  have  been  introduced  by 
member countries which put into operation Commu-
nity  schemes  for  modernising  farms  (the  Farm 
Development Scheme), and encouraging older farmers 
t? give up most of  their land (Pension and Amalgama-
tion Scheme). But the heart of the problem is the lack 
of employment in  rural areas generally,  and this  is 
essentially a problem for social and regional policies 
rather than agricultural policy. 
The price policy of the EEC 
Price. support for agricultural products still provides 
the basts. for the common agricultural policy. Since the 
~ew policy .had to replace six  national policies (and 
IS  now havmg to replace three more), agreeing on a 
system of support and a level of prices was one of the 
Community's biggest problems in the 1960s. Certain 
principles  could be readily  accepted  by all  member 
countries. Free trade in farm products throughout the 
Community was  the first,  together with Community 
preference ~hich gave EEC producers a price advan-
tage  over  Imports  from  non-Community  countries. 
This meant a common price system had to be adopted 
(not necessarily with the same floor price everywhere) 
and common import restrictions applied against third 
country  supplies.  The  costs  of support were  to  be 
borne by the Community as a whole. 
In  view  of  the  protectionist  tradition  of  most 
European agricultural policies,  it was  not surprising 
that the Six  should choose such a  system for them-
selves, seel?ng .stable prices on t~e internal market by 
only allowmg tmports to come m at controlled price 
levels and providing buying-in facilities which would 
offer an alternative outlet for produce at a guaranteed 
price  to  support the  market in  the  event  of prices 
falling too low. 
It was  not a  system  calculated to please  primary 
producers elsewhere in the world, especially at a time 
when world cereal production was expanding rapidly 
and the Canadians, Americans, and Australians wer~ 
seeking  outlets  for  their  own  low-cost  grain.  They 
argued  strongly  for  arrangements  which  would  be 
responsive  to  world  supply/demand  pressures  and 
which  would  support farmers  by  means  other than 
end-price. Such a development represented too big a 
break with tradition for the Six; it would have meant a 
departure into mechanisms  of policy  in  which  they 
were for the most part inexperienced and for which the 
necessary bureaucratic structure simply did not exist. 
The traditional support system was therefore adopted. 
But alt~ough the syste~ could be agreed, fixing the 
actual pnces was  more difficult because of the wide 
4  Unit of  acco~nt: The monetary unit used in pricing in the Community budget. 
One ua. is equivalent to the old US$. In February 1973 a reference rate for the 
£was fixed, at 2·1644 ua. 
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variation among the Six. German and Dutch prices for 
wheat,  for example,  were  a  great deal  higher  than 
French prices.  To reach common levels would have 
implications for both producers and consumers. 
After considerable difficulty, agreement was reached 
on common cereal  prices  to apply from  1967.  The 
compromise was on the higher side of  average between 
the French and German prices,  representing a  price 
drop for grain farmers in the Federal Republic and a 
substantial  increase  for  French  farmers,  somewhat 
~ffset by a special levy imposed by the French authori-
ties on. sales of wheat and barley. The political pres-
sures  Imposed  by  these  different  standpoints  still 
apply:  it is  the  German farmers  who  seek  higher 
~ommunity grain  prices,  while  the  French  oppose 
mcreases. 
Th~  ce~eals price.  su~port arrangements are highly 
effective  m  regulating mternal prices.  Imports must 
reach the threshold price level and levies are changed, 
daily, if  necessary, to bridge the gap between the world 
market price and the threshold price. When farmers at 
home expand their production and prices are depres-
~ed,  mer~hants are. ~ree to sell  to the buying-in  or 
mtel!'ention  a~thonttes at the guaranteed price, thus 
puttmg a floor m the market. When world prices move 
above the Community support and threshold levels, 
the  Community  authorities  can  impose  levies  on 
expo~s, so restricting the volume of export trade and 
keepmg domestic prices at an artificially low level in 
world terms. 
The other product sector which is effectively designed 
to put a solid floor in the market is that of milk and 
milk products. Although levies on cheaper imports are 
changed  less  frequently  than with  grains,  they  still 
respond to movements in world prices and support 
buying plays an important role in maintaining the price 
of  but~er and skimmed milk powder. By maintaining 
!he  .pnce of these products, the farmer's milk price is 
mdirectly  supported.  The  operation  of  the  milk 
supp?rt  system  has  come  in  for  especially  fierce 
cnticism as a result of support buying and the subse-
quent building up and disposal of  stocks. The political 
and practical difficulties confronting the Community 
in this and other commodity sectors will be dealt with 
in  the  next  issue  of the  Teachers'  Series,  but beef 
provides a topical example of  the need for change in the 
various market arrangements. 
There was an attempt in 1972 to introduce a system 
of support buying for  beef which  was  intended  to 
provide a solid guarantee for beef  producers, but when 
this system came to be tried in 1974 the Community 
was obliged to make it optional rather than obligatory 
~ecause of the problems which it raised. In theory the 
Import arrangements provide for levies to bridge the 
gap between Community and world prices, but relate 
the amount of levy  applied  to prices  on the Com-
munity market, so that when home-produced supplies 
are  short  and  prices  rise,  cheaper  imports  can  be 
brought in. 
For other products the common agricultural policy 
takes many forms.  Oilseeds are free  of import levies 
and direct  subsidies  are  paid  to  growers;  pigmeat, 
chicken  and eggs  are subject to the straightforward 
laws of supply and demand, coupled with control of 
cheap imports (hardly relevant, since the Community 
produces virtually 100 per cent of  its needs); a very low 
level of support is applied to fruit and vegetables; for 
mutton  and  lamb  there  is  no  support system,  but 
simply customs duties at fixed percentage rates. Conclusion 
Given  that  the  common  policy  is  designed  to 
insulate the Community market from world markets, 
whether world prices are higher or lower than EEC 
prices,  there is  a  great  deal  of flexibility  from  one 
commodity to another and also flexibility over time, in 
a continuing search for better arrangements. The basic 
problem is  to reconcile conflicts  of interest between 
producers, consumers, taxpayers, and the world out-
side, and to assure future supplies by keeping the more 
efficient producers in business without imposing unfair 
burdens on consumers or taxpayers. The policy is only 
seven years old,  and still feeling  its  way  in terms of 
reconciling these differences of interest. How it needs 
to cope with its many crises will be dealt with in our 
next article. 
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Glossary of Common Agricultural Policy Terms 
Basic price (prix de base): This applies to pigmeat and to fruit 
and vegetables. Once average market prices fall below the basic 
price, action may be taken to support the market by buying in 
surplus output. 
Compensatory amount: This is the amount used to take account 
of a fundamental difference in prices in intra-Community trade. 
It will apply at diminishing rates to much trade in farm products 
between the three new member countries and between old and 
new members. When a sales transaction is from a high-price to 
low-price member country, a restitution payment is  made; for 
trade in the other direction, a levy is charged. The country with 
the  higher  level  of  prices  administers  the  system.  Similar 
arrangements are used to take account of currency fluctuations, 
with 'monetary' compensatory amounts. 
Customs duties: These are not connected with the levies. As far 
as agricultural imports are concerned, they are applied at fixed 
rates on certain products imported from non-EEC countries-
16 per cent on live cattle, 20 per cent on beef and veal,  15  per 
cent on live sheep and 20 per cent on mutton and lamb. Various 
rates apply to fruit and vegetables. Duties may be reduced or 
suspended by the Council of Ministers. 
Denaturing (denaturation): To encourage the use  of wheat as 
animal feed, a denaturing premium can be granted to authorised 
users which makes wheat competitive with less expensive grains. 
Sugar can also be denatured so that it must be used for animal 
feed. 
Export refunds (restitution): To enable a Community exporter 
to sell on world markets, a refund or restitution payment can be 
made to bridge the gap between high Community price levels 
and lower world prices. 
Guide price (prix d'orientation): This applies to beef and veal and 
is  designed to act both as a target price and as  a  trigger  for 
import  control  and  support  buying.  There  is  a  single  rate 
throughout the Community. 
4 
Intervention  price  (prix  d'intervention):  This  is  the  price  at 
which  national  intervention  agencies  are  obliged  to buy  up 
commodities which are offered to them. It  is set at a given level-
for cereals about 8 per cent below the target prices. From the 
basic intervention price derived intervention prices for areas are 
set throughout the Community to allow for differences in supply 
and demand. For pigmeat the intervention price is set at 85--92 
per cent of the basic price. It  includes transport costs and is thus 
a wholesale rather than an on-farm price. 
Levy (prelevement): For cereals, the levies on non-Community 
imports are :fixed each day according to the cheapest offers at 
Rotterdam. For animal products such as pigmeat, the levies are 
fixed quarterly and contain two elements, one allowing for the 
difference  in cereal cost between world  and Community pro-
duction costs and another giving extra preference for Common 
Market producers. Levies  may also be imposed to discourage 
exports when world prices are high. 
Reference price (prix  de  reference):  Similar  to the sluicegate 
price, but applying to fruit and vegetable imports. Also used to 
describe weighted Community average prices for livestock. 
Sluicegate price (prix d'ecluse): This is :fixed for pigmeats, eggs 
and poultry and is reckoned to represent cost of production in 
non-member counties. A levy is payable on imports above this 
price and a supplementary levy on imports coming in below the 
sluicegate price. 
Target price (prix  indicatif):  Community policy  is  geared  to 
keep market prices as close as possible to the target price. For 
cereals this price is seasonally stepped to allow for storage costs 
throughout the year and it is  at its highest in areas which are 
most in deficit in grain. 
Threshold price (prix de seuil) : This is the minimum import price 
at which non-Community supplies of cereals, milk products and 
sugar can be delivered at Community ports. Once transport costs 
from the port are added, imports should be marketed at or above 
target  price.  Commodities  shipped  into  the  EEC  below  the 
threshold price are subject to levies to bring their cost up to the 
threshold level. DECLINEOF
ACRICULTURAL
WORKFORCE
Working  Population
1950  1970
Total in millions
20  20
percent in
agriculture
(including
forestry and
fishine)
Table 1T
R
A
D
E
 
A
S
S
O
C
I
A
T
E
S
'
 
A
N
D
 
A
S
S
O
C
I
A
B
L
E
S
'
 
T
R
A
D
E
 
D
E
P
E
N
D
E
N
C
E
 
O
N
 
T
H
E
 
E
E
C
 
A
F
R
I
C
A
 
G
a
m
b
i
a
 
0
.
3
6
 
7
5
 
4
5
 
5
7
 
2
.
5
 
8
6
 
7
0
 
4
7
 
S
e
n
e
g
a
l
 
3
.
8
 
7
4
.
6
 
7
0
 
6
0
.
7
 
1
.
2
 
8
3
.
3
 
7
5
:
 
6
4
.
1
 
U
p
p
e
r
 
V
o
l
t
a
 
5
.
2
 
3
0
.
1
 
2
0
 
6
3
.
2
 
M
a
l
i
 
.
.
 
.
.
.
 
.
.
.
 
:
 
3
.
6
 
.
6
8
.
2
 
.
.
 
)
0
 
6
4
:
2
 
.
.
 
.
.
 
N
i
g
e
r
i
a
 
5
3
.
7
 
6
2
 
3
0
 
4
7
 
K
E
Y
 
/
l
g
l
'
~
~
{
~
~
~
~
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
s
 
I
·
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
•
 
.
.
 
•
 
.
 
·
I
 
~
b
~
;
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
A
s
s
o
c
i
a
b
l
e
s
l
 
.
_
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
'
~
 
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
n
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
B
u
r
u
n
d
i
 
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
 
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
 
~
i
r
~
~
 
1
.
5
 
6
7
.
0
 
5
0
 
7
5
.
9
 
3
.
4
 
n
.
a
.
*
 
2
0
 
n
.
a
.
*
 
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
P
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
G
N
P
£
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 
o
n
 
e
n
l
a
r
g
e
d
 
E
 
E
C
 
f
o
r
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
%
o
f
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
s
 
t
o
 
%
o
f
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
*
n
.
a
.
 
=
 
n
o
t
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
R
u
a
n
d
a
 
U
g
a
n
d
a
 
S
o
m
a
l
i
a
 
3
.
4
 
3
4
.
1
 
9
.
6
 
2
9
 
2
.
8
 
n
.
a
.
*
 
3
0
 
4
0
.
0
 
4
5
 
5
5
 
2
5
 
n
.
a
.
*
 
1
0
.
5
 
4
1
 
5
5
 
5
2
 G
h
a
n
a
 
8
.
7
 
5
9
 
8
0
 
4
8
 
T
o
g
o
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
.
.
 
.
.
 
:
:
 
:
t
;
:
J
.
"
 
:
 
9
0
;
 
2
:
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
.
.
 
.
.
.
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
~
~
~
~
<
>
~
=
 
=
~
~
~
9
;
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
D
a
h
o
m
e
y
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
:
~
i
~
~
:
 
:
~
g
j
:
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
:
~
:
3
5
:
:
 
:
:
n
.
a
:
 
.
 
.
.
.
 
.
 
.
 
.
.
.
.
 
G
a
b
o
n
 
:
j
3
.
Q
~
 
:
7
~
;
~
;
 
.
 
.
 
.
 
.
 
.
.
.
 
C
o
n
g
o
 
P
A
C
I
F
I
C
 
F
i
j
i
 
0
.
5
3
 
4
5
 
1
6
0
 
1
8
 
T
o
n
g
a
 
0
.
0
8
 
1
2
5
 
C
A
R
I
B
B
E
A
N
 
B
a
r
b
a
d
o
s
 
G
u
y
a
n
a
 
0
.
2
6
 
5
4
 
0
.
7
6
 
2
1
0
 
3
4
 
1
4
0
 
5
5
 
1
4
 
2
8
 
4
1
 
W
.
 
S
a
m
o
a
 
0
.
1
4
 
6
1
 
5
5
 
1
4
 
j
a
m
a
i
c
a
 
T
r
i
n
i
d
a
d
 
2
.
0
 
2
0
 
1
.
1
 
1
4
 
2
3
0
 
2
9
 
3
7
0
 
1
8
 
T
a
n
z
a
n
i
a
 
1
3
.
0
 
3
7
 
3
5
 
4
8
 
M
a
u
r
i
t
i
u
s
 
:
:
9
:
~
~
:
:
 
1
~
;
{
 
:
.
·
 
9
5
>
 
.
a
:
s
;
~
.
 
M
a
l
a
w
i
 
4
.
4
 
6
9
 
2
0
 
5
6
 
S
w
a
z
i
l
a
n
d
 
0
.
4
1
 
n
.
a
.
 
*
 
8
5
 
n
.
a
.
 
*
 
L
e
s
o
t
h
o
 
0
.
8
9
 
n
.
a
.
*
 
3
5
 
n
.
a
.
*
 European Studies, 19, 1974 
East-West Relations 
Charles Ransom 
It is generally agreed that relations between the  Communist and non-Communist 
states, in  Europe and in  the world,  have greatly improved during the twenty-one years 
since the death of  Stalin in 1953, and that the 'Cold War' has been succeeded by detente. 
What precisely  is meant by the  'Cold  War'  is  perhaps  a  matter for argument,  and 
detente  also  has  various  connotations  within  its general meaning of a  relaxation of 
tension. But what has happened is that the atmosphere of  suspicion between the  Western 
and Eastern European states, which in the 1950s made it almost impossible for them to 
talk to each other in intelligible language, has given way to a greater confidence on both 
sides that there is a genuine desire for peace, a disposition to take seriously what is said 
by each, and a disinclination to dismiss every pacific move as part of  a plot to gain by 
subterfuge what cannot be won by war. Not all of  the suspicions have been dispelled and 
there are still large armed.forces in both parts of  Europe, but the expectation now is that 
difficulties can at least be discussed reasonably. 
War and co-existence 
The improvement in  East-West  relations  has  not 
been  a  smooth,  uninterrupted,  process.  There  have 
been periods, such as that from 1953, when Stalin died, 
to 1956,  the year of the Hungarian revolution; from 
1963, when the Test Ban Treaty was signed, until 1968, 
when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia; and 
from  1969,  when Herr Brandt became Chancellor of 
Federal Germany, until 1972,  which saw the ratifica-
tion of  the Treaties between Federal Germany and the 
USSR and Poland signed in 1970, all of which seemed 
to presage the beginnings of something entirely new. 
But between those periods of high optimism there 
have  been  other  periods  of disappointment,  when 
everyone has been reminded of the magnitude of the 
problems  under discussion.  In the  aftermath of the 
Hungarian  revolution  the  'Thaw'  refroze  and  even 
while Mr Kruschev was conducting his campaign for 
peaceful  co-existence  there  occurred  the  alarming 
incidents of the failure of the Summit Conference in 
1960, and the Cuba crisis of 1962. From time to time 
there have been periods of tension over the status of 
Berlin .. Now,  in  1974,  when  Federal  Germany  is 
wondering exactly what it has achieved by its Ostp.oli-
tik (Eastern policy), when the Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks (SALT) between the USSR and USA, the 
East-West  discussions  of the possibility  of reducing 
armed forces in Europe (the talks about Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reductions- MBFR) and the second 
stage of the European Security Conference begun in 
Helsinki  last  year,  are  all  in  some  difficulty  and 
registering  little  progress,  we  are in  another period 
when optimism has to be tempered, if not by scepti-
cism, then at least by infinite patience. The experience 
of  the last twenty years has taught us one incontrover-
tible  lesson:  that progress  in improving  East-West 
relations is slow, irregular, and painful, so slow in fact 
that public interest in the matter- never very high at 
the best of times - may easily be completely lost. 
Another lesson that experience has taught us is that 
progress is not simply the product of benevolence but 
is  much  more  the  outcome  of the  recognition  by 
governments that certain situations with which they are 
faced are, for all practical purposes, unalterable and 
must be lived with as peacefully as possible, however 
little they may be liked. 
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Of these realities or unalterable facts by far the most 
important  is  that  modern  warfare  conducted  with 
nuclear weapons would impose unacceptable destruc-
tion  upon all  who  engage in it and upon countless 
millions of uninvolved people besides. Until both sides 
acknowledged that this was so, suspicion persisted that 
those who remained silent were harbouring the belief 
that  they  could  win  a  nuclear  war  without  self-
destruction. When the USSR in Mr Krushchev's time 
acknowledged the reality and drew the conclusion that 
the  only  course  open  to modern  states  armed  with 
nuclear weapons is to co-exist peacefully, the door was 
atlast opened for discussion. Given that both sides now 
accepted this reality it became in the highest degree 
improbable that the USA and the USSR would go to 
war over anything short of a deliberate attack by the 
one upon the other.  Acceptance of this reality is the 
most  important  step  forward  taken  since  1945.  It 
would be catastrophic if it were proved to be alterable 
and any state were  to come to believe  that it .could 
'win' a nuclear war. 
Although  in the  Europe  of the  1970s  we  live  in 
peace and the Second World War may seem far away, 
many of  the most difficult East-West problems arose as 
a direct result of that war, and we are still living in its 
shadow. It shifted the point of contact between the 
Communist  and  non-Communist  systems  from  the 
frontiers  of Russia,  where  it stood in  1939,  to the 
heart of Europe, and the line along which the contact 
is now made very largely represents the halting-place 
of the  Anglo-American  forces  on  the  one  side  and 
the  Russian forces  on the  other in May  1945  when 
Germany surrendered (maps). 
The line passed through the territory of the pre-war 
German Reich and so created the 'German question', 
both  a  major  cause  and  a  recurrent  symptom  of 
tension between the USSR and its former allies from 
1945  onwards.  What was  in  question  was  whether 
Germany,  divided  into  zones  of occupation  by  the 
Allies  in  1945,  should  remain  fragmented . or  be 
permitted to reunite and, if  so, under what conditions? 
Where should Germany's Eastern frontier lie, in view 
of the fact that the Russians had by unilateral action 
incorporated a large tract of former German territory 
in Poland at the end of the war? The former wartime 
allies  could  agree  upon  answers  to  none  of these 
questions and only a few years were to pass before the Western and Russian zones of  occupation acquired the 
characteristic political, economic and social structures 
of the two 'systems' within which they were  placed, 
emerging  eventually  as  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany, a member of  the European Community and 
of NATO on the one hand, and the German Demo-
cratic Republic, a member of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (COMECON) and the Warsaw 
Pact on the  other,  without the signature  of a  peace 
treaty. 
Every stage in this development caused controversy 
between the USSR and the USA and their allies and 
neither side could acknowledge that the situation was 
unalterable. 
Two Germanies 
It is  understandable that the Germans themselves 
would  wish  that  their  country  should  one  day  be 
reunited and in the earlier post-war years the govern-
ment  of  Dr  Adenauer  in  Western  Germany  put 
reunification, under a democratic political system, in 
the forefront of its foreign policy aims, while the East 
German government, backed by the Russians, hoped 
for the reunification of Germany under a Communist 
government. By the early sixties it was already clear to 
many influential Germans on both sides that because 
the Great Powers were deadlocked such policies could 
not succeed. Whatever the long-term future might hold, 
it had to be accepted that for all practical purposes, 
and so long as the wartime allies could not agree about 
the  matter,  Germany  was  likely  to remain  divided. 
Eastern  Germany  began  to  work  for  recognition 
throughout the world of itself as a separate sovereign 
state. It became the policy of the Federal Republic, 
more especially under the influence  of Herr Brandt, 
first  as  Foreign  Minister  and  then  after  1969  as 
Chancellor, to see  what could be  done to break the 
deadlock  between the wartime Allies  by  making its 
own contribution to detente and by this means create 
the conditions under which, in due course, the future of 
Germany as a whole might be considered more calmly. 
So, accepting that for the present Germany is a nation 
divided  into  two  states,  it  put the  achievement  of 
detente  above  reunification  in  its  foreign  policy 
priorities. 
This  is  the  essence  of Herr  Brandt's  Ostpolitik, 
which  culminated  in  1972  in the  ratification  of the 
Treaties with the USSR and Poland, and a  general 
treaty  with  the  German  Democratic  Republic  (the 
DDR), having led  on the  way  to an agreement  on 
Berlin  between  the  USA,  France,  Britain,  and  the 
USSR  in  1971.  As  a  result  the  DDR has  secured 
virtually complete recognition as a separate state, and, 
as  such,  membership  of the  United  Nations.  The 
advantage  to  the  DDR is  readily  apparent.  What 
Federal Germany has gained  by  its  bold  Ostpolitik 
may  take  several  years  to  establish  but it is  now 
regarded in a  much more  friendly  spirit in Eastern 
Europe than was the case a few  years ago, and it is 
establishing  normal  diplomatic  relations  with  the 
states in that area. Both from its own and the European 
point of view,  one of the important gains is that the 
USSR in the course of all the recent negotiations has 
had,  on its  side,  to acknowledge  another reality  or 
unalterable fact, namely that the Federal Republic is a 
member of  the West European political system, and a 
leading  member  of the  European  Community,  and 
cannot  be  detached  from  them.  Thus  even  if the 
'German  question'  is  not yet  finally  answered,  the 
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principle of recognising realities has removed much of 
the bitterness from it. If  the idea behind Ostpolitik was 
right, co-existence and detente will provide conditions 
for calmer and more rational thought about the future 
of Germany as a whole. They can of themselves do no 
more than this;  nor can they  of themselves  provide 
answers  to  many  other difficult  questions,  affecting 
East-West relations in Europe. 
Soviet aims 
One  of these  problems,  and  perhaps  the  most 
elusive  of all,  is  to discover exactly  how strictly the 
Russians wish to exercise authority over their sphere 
of influence in Eastern Europe, and for what purpose 
they  wish  to  exercise  it.  That  Russian  power  and 
influence pervades the entire area is  unquestionable. 
The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 showed that 
an East European state which  seriously attempts to 
alter its political system will be called to· heel by the 
Russian  government.  The  East European states  are 
dependent  upon  the  USSR  for  most  of their  raw 
materials  and  energy  supplies;  their  armed  forces, 
co-ordinated  by  the  headquarters  of the  Warsaw 
Treaty  Organisation,  are  in  all  but  name  under 
Russian command; the head office and several of the 
chief departments of COMECON are in Moscow and 
its Secretary-General is a Russian. 
Yet despite all this there is a great variety of  life-style 
among the East European states;  their governments 
decide  a  great  range  of  political  and  economic 
questions for themselves, and quite often differ from 
the Russians in matters of policy  affecting the area. 
The way in which the Russians will exert their influence 
cannot  always  be  predicted  by  the  East  European 
states  themselves  with  any  certainty.  The  Soviet 
sphere of influence is  therefore a complex thing, but 
none the less real for being complex, and its effect is to 
throw  a  defensive  screen  around  one  half of the 
continent,  designed  to  limit  the  circulation  within 
Eastern  Europe  of  ideas  and  modes  of conduct 
familiar in Western Europe.  Has this to be accepted 
indefinitely  as  an  unalterable  fact  by  the  Western 
Nations?  Or alternatively,  will  the  USSR  have  to 
acknowledge that in order to secure improvements to 
its own advantage it must do something to meet the 
wishes of the Western nations for a more open Euro-
pean society? 
The Western States have been probing this question 
in the present Geneva stage of the European Security 
Conference to see whether freer personal and intellec-
tual interchange is  possible,  without much apparent 
success so far, chiefly because the Russians choose to 
interpret Western pleas for greater freedom of  contact 
and exchange of ideas between the peoples of Eastern 
and Western Europe as an attempt to open the Soviet 
sphere of influence to political intervention and sub-
version.  That they  can react  in  such  a  way  at the 
present time shows that there is still far to go before 
the Soviet sphere ceases to be defensive in character 
and  before  peaceful  co-existence  and  detente  can 
acquire a more human face.  So long as the Russians 
lack  confidence  in the  stability  of the  Communist 
regimes of Eastern Europe and consider uninhibited 
exchange with the liberal states of the West to be  a 
danger, so long will the defences of  the Soviet sphere be 
maintained not only in the form of military hardware 
but  also  in  the  form  of political  and  intellectual 
discipline. EEC and COMECON 
A  similar,  but less  fundamental,  question  is  the 
effect of economic integration and political develop-
ment of  the states of  Western and Eastern Europe upon 
East-West relations.! The principal reason for uncer-
tainty, and hence for the controversy which surrounds 
this  matter,  is  that  neither  the  Western  nor  the 
Eastern  States  have  yet  been  able  to agree  among 
themselves  on all  the  unalterable facts  of their own 
situations or the reality they expect the other side to 
accept and live with. It is  well known that for many 
years after the establishment of the European Com-
munity the USSR treated it with intense hostility and 
opposed, as far as it was able, the adherence of other 
States.  In the  end  it  was  powerless  to prevent  the 
enlargement  of the  Community  and  now  seems  to 
accept the fact. 
On the other hand, the USSR and the other states of 
Eastern Europe restrict their dealings with the Com-
munity as such to a minimum and will  not grant it 
diplomatic  recognition,  because  they  are  not faced 
with a situation which forces them to do so. Members 
of the European Community recognise  the fact  that 
COMECON,  the  East  European form  of economic 
integration,  exists.  But beyond that they  have  great 
difficulty in perceiving what the reality of  that organisa-
tion is in terms of international relations, because the 
members of COMECON have not yet made up their 
own minds about it. The chief problems here are, as so 
often is the case, West-West and East-East rather than 
East-West. The European Community for its part, is 
passing through a very difficult phase of its existence 
and can hardly be said to have very clear vision of  the 
next stage of its evolution. 
However well those working within the Community 
may understand and be prepared to resolve its present 
difficulties, to the outsider there must seem to be a good 
deal  of instability  in  its  present  condition.  If the 
Community itself cannot decide what to do it is hardly 
surprising if other States do not feel  bound to take 
more than formal cognizance of  its existence, especially 
when, like the USSR, they have been hostile in the past 
to the idea of  West European integration. If, or when, 
it  becomes  established  an unalterable  fact  that the 
Community  will  always  act  in  common  in  certain 
situations,  the  Russians  and their  allies  in  Eastern 
Europe will almost certainly accept the reality, but not 
before. Similarly, when the East Europeans have made 
up their minds about the international matters they 
wish  to  see  handled  centrally  by  the  COMECON 
organisation and the method to be used, then no doubt 
the West European nations and the European Com-
munity institutions will be prepared to accept and do 
business with a representative COMECON negotiating 
body, however little they may like it.  But until West 
and East have sorted out their own internal difficulties, 
uncertainty is likely to prevail in this sector of East-
1  The term 'economic integration' is used here to describe relations between the 
Member States of Comecon as  well  as  those of the EEC because  the  East 
Europeans themselves now use it in addition to the term 'co-operation'. It must, 
however. be borne in mind that both in theory and practice the Comecon system 
is much more like intergovernmental co-operation than integration as envisaged 
in the Treaty of Rome. Primary responsibility for planning still remains with the 
Member States and the many joint institutions which have been established are 
at least  in principle,  denied supra-national  oowers.  Although  the Comecon 
states have made some provision for common action in external affairs nothing 
comparable with the commitment of the EEC states in this respect has been 
accepted by the Comecon states. The  two organisations are not strictly comparable. 
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West  relations,  and  uncertainty  tends  to encourage 
controversy. 
Conclusion 
In a very short article it is not possible to do more 
than examine superficially some of the problems East 
and  West  have  faced  in  Europe  since  the  war,  to 
indicate the spirit in which nations have adjusted to 
situations which are still fluid, uncertain, or confused, 
with neither side being able to decide what is  in the 
mind  of the  other,  or what  has  to  be  accepted  as 
unalterable.  The  account  seems  to leave  very  little 
room for the creative spirit,  or any desire  to act in 
common for the establishment of a better Europe for 
all its citizens.  In so doing it does not give sufficient 
weight, perhaps, to the efforts individuals, groups and 
even  governments have exerted to make of 'co-exis-
tence' something warmer and more human than cold 
correctness  or  mutual  indifference.  But  the  fact 
remains  that  the  major  part  of the  effort  put  into 
improving East-West relations since  the  war  has been 
devoted  to  removing  dangers  that  could  have  led to 
serious conflict between the two super powers and their 
Allies,  rather  than  to  creating  the  basis for  an  all-
European society. 
We  are left  with  a  question.  Granting that East-
West relations  in Europe are better than they  were 
twenty years ago - in the sense that governments now 
accept the necessity for 'co-existence', take consider-
able care not to upset detente, and are ready to discuss 
issues  which  twenty  years  ago  would  have  been 
considered impossible  to discuss  - granting all  this, 
can they be said to be 'good' by any comparatively 
simple  definition  of 'good'  upon  which  both  sides 
could agree? 
Relations between individual people might be said 
to be  'good' if they do not fight,  steal each other's 
property or work for each other's downfall. They can 
co-exist  as  neighbours  by turning their backs  upon 
each other or keeping communication to a minimum. 
This  behaviour might  be  called  'good' in the  sense 
that  it is  normal  or correct,  but it is  hardly  very 
positive.  It is  too much  to expect  that nations,  as 
entities, can ever display in their relations with each 
other the higher qualities of relations between indivi-
duals. What they can do is provide the conditions in 
which  it is  easy  for  their  own  citizens  to  develop 
positive  relations with citizens  of other countries as 
with their fellow-nationals. It is questionable whether 
East-West relations in  Europe have yet  made  much 
progress in that direction. What the obstacles to such 
progress  are  and  what  may  be  the  possibility  of 
overcoming them will be the subject of  a second article. 
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The European Parliament 
John Houghton 
Participation in the European Parliament gives British members many possibilities 
under  its  different procedures  to  exercise  the  parliamentary function  of challenging 
European  Ministers from  the  Council,  questioning  them  and  obtaining  information 
from them,  both in plenary sessions and,  more especially,  in  committees. In  the same 
way the work and proposals of  the Commission are closely scrutinised and debated and 
Commissioners questioned. 
To  conduct  this process  effectively,  analysing  and debating  Community  activity 
and proposed legislation  in  the  parliaments  of individual  Member  States  would  be 
impracticable  - despite  the  activities of committees such  as  the  recently  established 
British parliamentary committees on Secondary EEC Legislation. 
This  summary sets out  briefly  the  composition  and procedures of the  European 
Parliament,  views it in  the context of the  Community institutions, and indicates those 
areas where changes are occurring which  will make it more effective in its advisory and 
supervisory role and as the Community watchdog. 
Background 
The people of the European Community have been 
represented  in  a  European  Assembly  - later  the 
European  Parliament  - for  nearly  a  quarter  of a 
century.  Since  the  enlargement  of  the  European 
Community on January 1,  1973,  Members of Parlia-
ment from  Britain,  Denmark and Ireland have  also 
been members of this parliamentary body. 
When in 1951, taking up a suggestion by the French 
Foreign  Minister  Robert  Schumann,  six  European 
countries - Belgium,  France,  West  Germany,  Italy, 
Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands  - agreed  in  the 
Treaty of  Paris to pool their coal and steel resources in 
the European Coal and Steel Community, they agreed 
to base this Community on firm democratic principles. 
Accordingly, they decided that ordinary people should 
be represented in a Common Assembly which would 
have power to oversee the ECSC's executive body, the 
High  Authority.  This  Assembly,  with  78  members 
drawn  from  all  of the  Member  States  first  met  in 
Strasbourg, France on September 10,  1952. 
Some five years later, when the Six signed the Treaty 
of Rome on March 25,  1957 it was resolved to extend 
the role of this  parliamentary assembly  to  maintain 
democratic  control  over  the  three  communities,  the 
European Economic Community (EEC), the European 
Coal  and Steel  Community  (ECSC),  the  European 
Atomic  Energy  Community (Euratom).  These  three 
communities make up the European Community as we 
know it today, their institutions having been merged to 
provide a single Council of Ministers and a Commis-
sion  in  July  1967.  The  Common  Assembly  of the 
ECSC  was  replaced  on  March  19,  1958  by  a  new 
Assembly,  which  at  its  first  sitting  in  Strasbourg 
adopted  the  title  of  the  European  Parliamentary 
Assembly  or European  Parliament.  The  number  of 
Members  of the  Parliament  was  increased  by  the 
Treaty of Rome to 142 and, following the accession of 
Britain, Denmark and Ireland, became  198  in  1973, 
representing some 253 million people. Britain, France, 
Germany and Italy are entitled to 36  members each, 
Belgium and the Netherlands 14 each, Denmark and 
Ireland 10 each and Luxembourg 6. 
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The political groups 
The Members of  the Parliament come from some 50 
political parties. There are, in addition, independent 
members. Although from different countries many of 
these parties share political viewpoints and have thus 
combined  together  into  European  political  groups. 
There are today six such groups:  1 
Christian Democrats  52 members, 7 countries 
Socialists  50 members, 8 countries 
Liberals and Allies  24 members, 8 countries 
European Conservatives  20 members, 2 countries 
European Progressive 
Democrats 
Communists 
17 members, 2 countries 
13 members, 3 countries 
(8 Independent Members) 
In the  Chamber the  Members  sit  not according  to 
nationality but in their respective groups (see Table 1). 
The  political  groups  are  central  to  the  smooth 
functioning of  the Parliament whose procedures are so 
arranged as to bring into play inter-group discussion 
and  decisions  whenever  practicable.  They  play  a 
leading role in the operation of the committee system, 
and parliamentary business is arranged by consultation 
between the groups in the enlarged bureau (see page 2). 
Each group  has its  own  staff  and  secretariat,  paid 
directly  from  the  Parliament's  budget.  The  groups 
usually nominate spokesmen to express their points of 
view in plenary session debates, and group members 
usual1y  vote in accordance with the decision of that 
group.  Voting  in  the  Parliament  is  normally  by  a 
show of hands; where the vote is in doubt Members 
are asked to indicate their vote by standing. 
The specialised committees 
Most  of the  detailed  work  of the  Parliament  is 
undertaken in specialised standing committees.  Since 
March  1967,  acting  under  its  Rules  of Procedure, 
Parliament has  maintained  about twelve  such  com-
1  The British Labour Party decided that, pending the outcome of its renegotia-
tions of the terms of  British accession it would not allow its Members to sit in the 
European Parliament. The British delegation has therefore remained incomplete 
since British accession. If Labour members were  to join the socialist group it 
could become the largest European political group. mittees  whose  names  alone  indicate  the many  and 
varied fields of activity of  the Communities which it is 
Parliament's  task  to  scrutinise.  The  names  and 
responsibilities of the committees have from  time  to 
time been changed. They are today: 
Political Affairs Committee 
Legal Affairs Committe.e  . 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Committee on Budgets 
Committee on Social Affairs and Employment 
Committee on Agriculture 
Committee on Regional Policy and Transport 
Committee on Public Health and the Environment 
Committee on Energy, Research and Technology 
Committee on Cultural Affairs and Youth 
Committee on External Economic Relations 
Committee on Development and Cooperation 
In addition there are  joint Committees of  Association 
with  Greece  and  with  Turkey,  a  Committee  of 
Association ~ith  the East African Community (Kenya, 
Uganda  and  Tanzania)  and  a  joint  Parliamentary 
Conference  of Association  and Committee  between 
the Community and the (Yaounde) Associated African 
States and Madagascar (AASM).  The main standing 
committees have about 29 members each, except for 
the  External  Economic  Relations  and Development 
and Cooperation Committees which  ~ach have 35. 
Politically  speaking  the  me~bership of the  co~­
mittees reflects that of the Parliament as a whole; m 
practice  this  has  meant that members  from  all  the 
Member States and all the political groups have been 
included in the membership of  each committee. This is 
important since the committees - meeting usually in 
Brussels - are the main point of liaison between the 
Parliament and the Commission, representatives from 
the Commission ~articipating closely in their ~ork.  I~ 
this way the Parliament, through the Committees,  IS 
able to influence both the thinking and planning of  the 
Commission.  It is  also  important in  that  by  being 
representative of the political groups an~ nationalities 
of  the Parliament as a whole, the committees act as an 
effective  forum  where  differences  of approach  and 
point  of view  may  be  reconciled  or  clarified,  and 
consensus views  obtained prior to debate in plenary 
session. The actual composition of  the committees and 
their chairmanship and vice-chairmanship is  decided 
by the political groups. 
It  is the main task of the committees to prepare the 
ground for the plenary deb~tes. In 1973 the Parlia_m~nt 
met in plenary session 12 times for a total of  52 stttmg 
days; some 222 motions l?repared at som~  ~96 com-
mittee meetings were constdered. at these sittmgs.  ~he 
committees  also  send  delegations  on  fact-findmg 
missions to investigate particular problems in the area 
of  the Member States. For example, a group of mem-
bers from  the  Regional Policy  and Transport Com-
mittee recently visited parts of  Ireland, both North and 
South,  studying  economic.  a~d  so~ial  proble~s in 
relation  to  the  Commumty s  pohcy  for  reg10nal 
development. 
Plenary sessions and the 
Parliamentary process 
Parliament  meets  in plenary session  at least  once 
a  month:  some  thirteen part sessions  are due  to be 
held in  1974. The proceedings and debates take place 
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in all the official languages of  the Community (French, 
English,  German,  Italian).  Althoug~ it has  its  Sec-
retariat  at  the  Kirchberg  Centre  tn  Luxembourg, 
Parliament  only meets  there  for  parts  of the  year; 
most plenary sessions are held in. Europe House,  t~e 
seat  of the  Council  of Europe tn Strasbourg.  This 
somewhat impractical situation, further complicated 
by  the  need  for  committee  meetings  to be  held  in 
Brussels  and  for  Council  Ministers  and  Commis-
sioners  'to  attend  plenary  sittings,  results  from  an 
uneasy  political  compromise  between  the  M~mber 
States. It  is general1y agreed that the final solut10.n. to 
the siting problem awaits agreement on the final Siting 
of all of the Community's institutions. 
The Parliament's proceedings are presided over by 
the  President  (Cornelis  Berkhouwer  of the  Nether-
lands in 1973 and 1974) and, in his absence, the vice-
presidents,  who  are all elected. annually on the  ~rst 
plenary part session of  each parliamentary year (which 
begins in March). Together ther make up the Bu~e.au, 
which,  together  with  the presidents  of the political 
groups, forms the enlarged bureau, and prepares the 
agendas for the sessions.  . 
Parliament  may  debate  any  matter  which. ~omes 
within  the  aims  and  scope  of the  Commumties  as 
defined  in  the  Treaties  of Rome  and Paris  and as 
extended  through  Community  activities  authoris.ed 
under Article 235  of the  Rome Treaty.2 In practice 
there are few - if any - subjects Parlia~ent is not. B:ble 
to discuss. World or European economtc and political 
events frequently occasion debates often arranged at 
short  notice.  There  are  annual  general  debates, 
including an annual colloquy  with  the  Council,  the 
Commission's  annual  general  report  on  the  Com-
munities,  the future programme of the Commission, 
report on the social situation, the Community budget, 
and a joint meeting with the Consultative Assembly of 
the Council of Europe. 
Matters  are  brought  before  the  Parliament  and 
considered in the following main ways :3  . 
1.  The  Parliament  is  consulted  by  the  Council  of 
Ministers before the Council takes a decision (involving 
the issue of regulations or ~irectives) o11:  the ~asi_s of 
proposals from the CommissiOn. Contact ts mamtamed 
at the  formative  stages  of a  Commission  proposal 
through  Committee  meetings  in  Brussels.  When 
complete, a proposal is formally se.nt to the ~arliam~nt 
together with a letter to the Prestdent askmg  Pa~lta­
ment's opinion. It is then referred to the appropnate 
committee or committees which,  on a proposal from 
the  political  groups,  nominate  a  rapporteur.  A 
representative  of  the  Commission  introduces  the 
proposal  to  the  committee. w~ich discusses  it  B:nd 
considers  drafts  of  a  prehmmary  report.  Havmg 
considered opinions of other committees, if any,  t~e 
committee adopts formally a  ~ext of the  repor~. This 
generally  consists  of  a  motion  together  With  an 
explanatory  statement:  It is  ~hen  publis~ed  as  a 
Working Document pnor to ~em~  debated m pl~nary 
session.  In debate the committee s rapporteur mtro-
duces the report, representatives of  the political groups 
and other members may give opinions prior to voting, 
and move amendments. Some motions on matters of 
2  Article  235  states: 'H action  by  the Community should prove  necessar~ to 
attain, in the course of  the operation of  the Comm<?n Market, one of  the obJectives 
of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the  necess~ry. powers, the 
Council shall, acting unanimously on a  pr~posal from the Comm1ss1on and after 
consulting the Assembly, take the appropnate measures. 
3  This  description of procedure is  greatly  simPlified:  for a  more precise and 
detailed analysis the reader is recommended to consult The European Parliament 
by Sir Barnett Cocks (see Further Reading below). no political interest are adopted without debate on the 
recommendation  of  the  appropriate  committee. 
Resolutions are then forwarded to the Commission, 
the  Council,  and any  other bodies  named,  and  are 
published in the Official Journal. 
2.  A committee may itself study a matter within its 
competence  and,  with  the  approval  of the  Bureau 
present a report to Parliament. 
3.  A motion for a resolution on matters related to the 
activities of the Communities may be tabled by  any 
Member of  the Parliament and, following the Rules of 
Procedure is then normally referred to the appropriate 
committee (otherwise, details as in (1)). 
4.  Oral questions to the Council or to the Commission 
without  debate  may  be  addressed  by  any  Member 
through  the  President  who  puts  them  before  the 
enlarged bureau to decide if they will be included on 
the  agenda.  The  questions  may,  however,  at  the 
discretion  of the  enlarged  bureau,  be  answered  in 
writing. Questions with debate to the Council or to the 
Commission may be tabled by five or more members, a 
committee  or  a  political  group.  Again,  they  go 
initially before the President and the enlarged bureau. 
A Question Time is held in the morning of one of the 
middle  days  of  sittings  where  oral  questions  are 
answered by the Commission or the Council. Such a 
question may, at the request of a political group or at 
least  five  members,  then  be  followed  directly  by  a 
debate.  Written  Questions  to  the  Council  and  the 
Commission are dealt with  outside the sessjon  and, 
together  with  their  answers  are  published  in  the 
Official Journal. 
In  1973  Members  put  down  some  1,224  parlia-
mentary questions as follows: 
419 at Question Time 
109 to the Council 
310 to the Commission 
41  Oral Questions 
9 to the Council 
32 to the Commission 
764 Written Questions 
97 to the Council 
667 to the Commission. 
Increasing powers and the 
future 
Article 137 of the Rome Treaty defined the Parlia-
ment's powers as  'advisory and supervisory'.  It was 
intended  that the  Parliament should  exercise  demo-
cratic control over the activities of the Communities 
and  Article  144  of the  Treaty  of Rome  gave  it an 
important instrument of  control: power to dismiss the 
Commission as a whole by a motion of  censure (if this 
is carried by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, 
representing  a  majority  of  the  Members  of  the 
Assembly.)  In  fact,  because  this  instrument  is  so 
drastic,  although  its  use  has  been  threatened  on  a 
limited number of occasions, it has never been fully 
carried through. Nevertheless it is perhaps on account 
of this distant threat that the Commission has  been 
attentive  to  the  views  of Parliament  and  that  the 
complex  arrangements  for  questioning,  consultation 
and debates (see above) have worked as well  as they 
have. 
The development of  the Communities has, of  course, 
brought about changes in the institutional pattern of 
decision-taking in the Community. The most impor-
tant  was  the  'Luxembourg  Compromise'  of  1966 
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whereby, at French insistence, the principle of  Council 
unanimity on important questions was upheld. Other 
changes - confirmed in the Treaty which merged the 
Institutions - have also led to the toning down of the 
supranational elements of  the Treaties and an effective 
decline  in  the  role  of the  Commission.  Since  it is 
mainly in control over the Commission that Parlia-
ment's powers are enshrined this has had important 
implications.  Peter  Kirk  (European  Conservative, 
UK),  as  rapporteur  for  the  Parliament's  Political 
Committee  has  written  recently:  'Parliament  has 
almost  ignored  the implications  for its  role  of this 
change in the institutional balance.  By concentrating 
on trying to "control" the  Commission in a  period 
when  the Member States  have  shown - despite  the 
high-flown phrases of Summit communiques and talk 
of  "European  Union"  - that  they  are  primarily 
interested  in  using  the  European  Communities  to 
achieve intergovernmental cooperation rather than to 
achieve a federal direction, Parliament has misdirected 
its energy. In this climate the Council has increasingly 
confirmed its dominant status and Parliament has not 
only  been  unable  to  "control" it,  since  it lacks  the 
institutional means  to  do so,  but has seemed  to be 
unaware that its "control" over the Commission has 
become increasingly remote from the political realities 
of the Community'.4 
There is evidence to suggest that this situation may 
improve: the Council does recognise the importance of 
Parliament's role.  Recently  the new  French Foreign 
Minister  Mr  Sauvagnargues,  as  President  of  the 
Council (France is currently chairing the Community's 
institutions)  acknowledged  this  by  making  his  first 
official  Ministerial  address  before  the  European 
Parliament - before even addressing his own National 
Assembly. 
More  important,  strengthened  budgetary  powers 
have  recently  been  agreed  (by  Council  decision  of 
June  4,  1974)  by  which  Parliament will  gain  appre-
ciable  new  powers  of budgetary control  over Com-
munity  decision-making.s  The  agreement  marks  a 
considerable  advance  on  the  Parliament's  present 
powers and has political significance going beyond the 
technical aspects of budgetary decision, implementa-
tion and auditing. It means that control over expendi-
ture under the Community budget, which by changes 
brought  about  by  adoption  of the  'own  resources' 
system of budgetary finance will no longer result from 
annual  votes  in  the  national  parliaments,  will  be 
brought  under  close  parliamentary  scrutiny  and 
control at European level. 
The  new  powers  are  to have  the  following  main 
elements: 
- Parliament  will  have  the  power  to  amend  the 
annual  budget  proposals  put forward  by  the 
Commission, provided that the changes made do 
not  have  the  effect  of increasing  the  overall 
budget total. The Council will retain the right to 
reject the changes  by  a  qualified majority vote 
(i.e. 41  votes out of 58). 
- Parliament will  continue to be able to propose 
amendments which do increase the budget total 
which the Council may then accept or reject. 
- Parliament will  be  able  'with good  reason'  to 
reject the draft budget in its entirety. 
- A  new  Community  institution,  the  Court  of 
4  Draft Report to the Parliament's Political Affairs Committee on the strengthen-
ing of the powers of the European Parliament. 
s The agreement now awaits ratification by the Member States. Auditors, is to be set up with powers to control 
and check expenditure from Community funds 
by  Community  institutions  and  the  national 
governments and their agencies.  In this context 
the Parliament also proposes to set  up its own 
Public Accounts  Committee to  work  with  the 
Court of Auditors. 
- A consultation - or conciliation -procedure is to 
be  instituted  when  the  Parliament  and  the 
Council  disagree  about  a  Community  policy 
decision  with  'considerable  financial  implica-
tions'. 
Subject to being overruled by the majority voting 
provision the Parliament will  therefore have the last 
word on expenditure within the budget total proposed 
by  the  Commission.  This  represents  an  important 
increase  in  the  scope  of  Parliament's  powers,  as 
hitherto it has only had powers of recommendation, 
except  in  the  case  of  administrative  expenditure 
amounting to some 3-4 per cent of the total budget. 
The  proposals  for  power  over  'non-automatic' 
expenditure  - subject  to  the  proposed  consultation 
procedure-wil1 give the Parliament control over about 
13 per cent of the total budget. The Parliament will be 
playing an important role in the decision procedure 
when  Community  policy  involving  considerable 
expenditure (e.g. regional development) or the renewal 
of an  existing  policy  requiring  new  revenue  to  be 
raised (e.g.  overseas development aid) is  being consi-
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dered.  If Commission  proposals  for  regional  fund 
expenditure are finally  implemented and social fund 
and other expenditure grows as forecast by the Com-
mission, this will give  Parliament direct control over 
about  25  per  cent  of the  budget.  Changes  in  the 
balance  of  budget  expenditure  between  different 
policies may, moreover, serve to increase this figure, 
as  for  example  if  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
expenditure is  reduced as planned in the late 1970s. 
The increase in the Parliament's powers is reflected 
in  renewed  moves  to  bring  about  direct  elections. 
Article  138  (3)  of the  Rome  Treaty  states:  'The 
Assembly  shall  draw  up  proposals for  elections  by 
direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform 
procedure in  aU  Member States.  The Council shall, 
acting  unanimously,  lay  down  the  appropriate 
provisions,  which  it  shall  recommend  to  Member 
States for adoption in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements'. It is this aspect that will 
be examined in the next issue of the Teachers' Series. 
Further reading 
CocKs,  SIR  BARNETT:  The  European  Parliament: 
Structure,  procedure  and  practice.  HMSO  London, 
1973.  ' 
NIBLOCK, MICHAEL: The EEC: National Parliaments in 
Community  Decision-making.  Chatham  House/PEP. 
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